The most important aspect here is the implied consent of cooperating states that, in specifically outlined areas, actions by the commission are tantamount as an act of each of the member states. This paper will examine this principle with the purpose of identifying the extent to which commissions can claim as agents of its member states. This examination will focus on the experience of the European Commission. An understanding of this aspect can provide a roadmap and the dynamics to the responsibilities of the commission as well as the jurisdictional authority, a complicated variable that often creates conflict.Commissions have different definitions. This is due to the fact that they assume different characteristics as defined by the rules or the laws that govern its establishment. The constitution or by-laws of a commission would often provide an article that defines its nature, mandate, responsibilities, and authority. However, a general conception that typifies these organizations is that they are bodies that serve as common agencies of parties that collectively cooperate for specific purposes. For example, the commission organized to resolve the interstate water conflict in the United States is a corporate and political body that serves as an agency for the representatives of the concerned states, serving as commissioners (Sherk, 2000, pp.706). The decisions made and contracts and transactions entered into by the commission are binding for all the states involved. There is also the case of the International Law Commission, which is tasked – by the strength of the commitment given by the member countries – to resolve interstate conflicts according to international laws and conventions. It is a legal animal so to speak, a judicial institution by which members accede. The European Commission is considered a regulatory body, which pervades the ethos of the institution that focuses on quasi-legislative, quasi-judicial as well as the executive component within the Commission’s competences (Cini, 2007, p. 32).